Conserving Native Vegetation on Private Land: Subsidizing Sustainable Use of Biodiversity by Stoianoff, NP & Kelly, AH
 Stoianoff & Kelly 2005 1 
Conserving Native Vegetation on Private Land: 
Subsidising Sustainable Use of Biodiversity? 
 




The Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 (the Biodiversity Convention) has as its 
primary objective the conservation of biological diversity.1 Running a close second is 
the objective of sustainable use of biological diversity.2 Simultaneous achievement of 
such objectives often runs contrary to the desires of large land owners in Australia, 
particularly when such land owners are engaged in primary production industries.  
 
We have seen disastrous effects of land clearing practices by the agricultural sector 
resulting in millions of acres of destroyed habitats and lost ‘biodiversity’ (biological 
diversity)3. In the past, these farming practices have been not only condoned by the 
government but subsidised as well. 
 
Now with the commitment of the Australian Federal Government to the conservation 
of biodiversity as part of its obligations under the Biodiversity Convention, we see a 
concerted effort to encourage good management practices. This commitment has 
manifested itself in various regulatory instruments. However, in economic terms, the 
Federal Government established the National Heritage Trust providing $2.5 billion for 
managing the environment. This was achieved in 1997 with the partial sell-off of the 
government telecommunications corporation, Telstra, and was extended for a further 
five years in the 2001/2002 Federal Budget. 
 
One of the economic initiatives funded has been the concessional tax treatment of 
voluntary conservation covenants entered into by land owners with an authorised 
government agency. This is available under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(Cth) (ITAA97). Although the initiative is a subsidy contrary to the polluter pays 
principle, the subsidy is limited in effect while the covenant conserving biodiversity is 
perpetual. The effect seems to reinforce the importance of economic incentives 
working together with environmental regulations to ensure the necessary investment 
in environmental measures by industry.4 There is a ‘partnership’ established between 
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2 Ibid, Article 1. 
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Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Dept of the Environment, Sport and Territories, 1996, 
p.1, http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/intro.html> (accessed 15/7/04) 
4 The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford University 
Press, 1987, (Brundtland Report), p. 64, 220. 
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government and private land owners holding environmentally valuable land. The 
‘partnership’ objective is thus the conservation of the biodiversity found on that land. 
 
With such investment encouraged through subsidies there is a shift from the consumer 
of the product to the taxpayer as the party who ultimately pays for the preventative or 
restorative measure.5 This is in line with the Brundtland Report on sustainable 
development which espoused “[t]he integration of economic and ecological factors 
into the law and into decision-making systems”.6 
 
This paper explores the need for and the operation of the concessional tax treatment 
afforded to conservation covenants since the beginning of this century. 
 
Conservation and sustainability 
 
The Biodiversity Convention was one of four major documents presented at the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), held at 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992.7 Australia ratified the Biodiversity Convention 
on 18 June 1993 and has steadily taken steps to implement the obligations found in 
the Convention. The three main objectives of the Convention are contained in Article 
1 with, arguably, the most important objective being the obligation to conserve 
biological diversity. The remaining objectives of sustainable use of biodiversity and 
equitable sharing of the benefits derived from access to and the use of such 
biodiversity cannot be achieved on a continuing basis without active in-situ 
conservation.  
 
In order to implement Australia’s obligations under the Biodiversity Convention it 
was recognised that a coherent strategy was necessary to bring together the varying 
initiatives for conservation at all three levels of government, namely, federal, state 
and local. Accordingly, the National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s 
Biological Diversity (the National Strategy) was issued in 1996 in an attempt to 
provide an integrated approach to conservation.8  
 
The main objectives of the National Strategy are: 
• the conservation of biological diversity across Australia;9 
• the integration of biological diversity conservation and natural resource 
management;10 and 
• the management of threatening processes.11 
                                                 
5 Ibid, Brundtland Report, p. 221. 
6 Ibid, Brundtland Report, p. 64. 
7 See GA Res 44/228, GAOR, 44th Sess. Supp. No. 49 at 151, UN Doc.A/44/49 (1989) as cited in 
Blakeney, M., Biodiversity Rights and Traditional Resource Rights of Indigenous Peoples, [1998] 2 
BSLR 52. 
8 National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Dept of the Environment, 
Sport and Territories, 1996, p.3, http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/intro.html> 
(accessed 15/7/04) 
9 National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Dept of the Environment, 
Sport and Territories, 1996, Ch 1, 
http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/chap1.html> (accessed 15/7/04) 
10 National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Dept of the Environment, 
Sport and Territories, 1996, Ch 2, 
http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/chap2.html> (accessed 15/7/04) 
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Each of these broad objectives has various specific objectives.12 For example, the 
establishment of “a system of voluntary or cooperative reserves, or both, and other 
management schemes on private lands to complement the protection provided by the 
public estate in protected areas” forms objective 7.1(c) of the National Strategy. 
Figgis notes the embodiment of objective 7.1(c) in the National Reserve System 
Program which has received funding of up to $84 million from the National Heritage 
Trust.13 Private land purchases or conservation covenants attract 2:1 funding by the 
National Reserve System Program and are considered a cost-effective way for the 
Commonwealth to meet biodiversity conservation targets.14 
 
Australia has been classified as one of the world’s 17 mega-diverse nations.15 There 
are more than 15,000 species of native higher plants (flowering plants) in Australia 
with approximately 7.500 species in each of the states of Queensland and Western 
Australia.16 This botanical diversity is greater than that found in all of Europe, and 
there are still new species being discovered in Australia.17 On the relationship 
between biodiversity and progress the Australian Bureau of Statistics notes: 
 
“Our native plants, animals and ecosystems bring significant economic 
benefits, are valuable to society and are globally important. Most importantly, 
the ways in which organisms interact with each other and their environment 
are important to human survival: we rely on ecosystems that function properly 
for clean air and water and healthy soil.”18 
 
Accordingly, the two main indicators used to describe the state of biodiversity in 
Australia have been the numbers of extinct and threatened Australian birds and 
mammals, and the clearing of native vegetation.19 Conservation covenants are but one 
form of encouraging the abatement of land clearing practices. 
 
Land Clearing Practices 
 
Since the beginning of European settlement in Australia in 1788, land clearing, 
predominantly for agricultural purposes, was an accepted practice encouraged by 
                                                                                                                                           
11 National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Dept of the Environment, 
Sport and Territories, 1996, Ch 3, 
http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/chap3.html> (accessed 15/7/04) 
12 In 2001, these were revised by the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Western Australian, South 
Australian, Victorian, and Australian Capital Territory governments in response to a progress report 
commissioned by ANZECC (The Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation 
Council), Australian Commonwealth Government, National Objectives and Targets for Biodiversity 
Conservation 2001 – 2005, p.5. 
13 Penelope Figgis, Conservation on Private Lands: the Australian Experience, IUCN, Glan, 
Switzerland and Cambridge, UK, 2004, p.6. 
14 Ibid, Figgis 2004, p.10. 
15 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Measures of Australia’s Progress: The measures - The natural 
landscape, 2004, p. 10, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@nsf/0/62C0CCADA5421F81CA256E7D0000264B?Open> 
(accessed 15/9/05) 
16 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004, p. 10. 
17 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004, p. 10. 
18 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004, p. 3. 
19 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004, p. 3. 
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Australian governments through taxation incentives20 and land purchase agreements, 
as well as being advised upon by government agricultural departments.21 It was not 
until almost 200 years later that concern over the loss of native vegetation led those 
same governments to enact controls on land clearing practices.22 However, in those 
200 years, the National Land and Water Resources Audit of 2001 found that 20% of 
woodland and forest have been cleared or thinned, amounting to more that 700,000 
square kilometres.23 That same audit also found that 35% or 130,000 square 
kilometres of mallee bush was cleared, while 45% of heath and 10% of grasslands 
were cleared.24 These statistics take on an even more alarming meaning when it is 
recognised that the highest levels of clearance have taken place in the most fertile 
areas in Australia resulting in the removal of 90% of vegetation in the eastern 
temperate zone.25  
 
The impact of land clearing on the environment is significant. In a report of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics it was noted: 
 
“Land clearance is a key pressure on biodiversity, and an estimated 1,000 to 
2,000 birds permanently lose their habitat for every 100 ha of woodland 
cleared. About 14% of Australia’s total greenhouse emissions are estimated to 
arise from land clearance (greenhouse gases are released from the burning and 
decay of vegetation and from the disturbance of soil which releases carbon). 
Clearing vegetation plays an important role in the spread of invasive species, 
land degradation an declining water quality (which are important to the 
environment and can impose costs upon the economy).”26  
 
In the same report, the economic impact of land clearing was also noted such as the 
“costs associated with reduced flood control, the provision of potable water or 
increased salinity and soil erosion”.27 It is no wonder that the 1990s saw the 
implementation of native vegetation acts in New South Wales, Queensland and South 
Australia in an attempt to control the clearing of native vegetation.28 
 
Despite the steady decline in land clearing since 1991, with 40% less land being 
cleared in 2001 compared to 199129, the greatest threat to Australia’s biodiversity is 
still said to be due to habitat destruction through land clearing.30 Australia fares 
                                                 
20 Section 75A of the Income tax Assessment Act 1936 provided a specific incentive allowing for the 
deduction of costs associated with land clearing activities such as the destruction and removal of 
timber, scrub or undergrowth indigenous to the land which was to be used for agricultural purposes. 
This provision was repealed in 1983 removing the special deduction. 
21 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Measuring Australia’s Progress: 2002, The headline indicators – 
Land Clearance, p. 2, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@nsf/0/1C36C09104A4765ACA256BDC001223FE?Open> 
(accessed 15/9/05) 
22 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002, p. 2. 
23 Op. cit., n. 15, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 7. 
24 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 7. 
25 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 7. 
26 Op. cit., n 20, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, p. 4. 
27 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, p. 4. 
28 Recently, the New South Wales legislation was replaced by more stringent controls on clearing 
practices. 
29 Op. cit., n. 15, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 10. 
30 Op. cit., n. 13, Figgis 2004, p. 1. 
 Stoianoff & Kelly 2005 5 
poorly on the world stage when considering deforestation figures. In 2003, figures 
revealed that Australia was clearing land at the rate of 500,000 hectares per year, 
comparable to the worst deforestation rates in Asia, South America and Africa.31  
 
Figgis notes that “the vast majority of clearing has been occurring on private 
leasehold or freehold lands”.32 This is no surprise considering the main reason for the 
clearing has been for agricultural purposes. When this is combined with the fact that 
about two thirds of Australia’s land is private leasehold or freehold land,33 the 
importance of government and private landholders working together to achieve 
conservation goals becomes apparent. 
 
Managing the Environment 
 
The National Strategy recognised the importance of conservation on privately held 
land and the need to provide appropriate incentives for conservation such as 
“appropriate market instruments and appropriate economic adjustments for owners 
and managers” of property requiring protection of significant biodiversity.34  Further, 
the National Strategy specifically targets the issue of clearing native vegetation at 
Objective 3.2 requiring the establishment of “effective measures … to retain and 
manage native vegetation, including controls on clearing”.35 This objective became 
the first of the priority actions set in the National Objectives and Targets for 
Biodiversity Conservation 2001-2005.36 Consequently, the land protected in nature 
conservation reserves has grown37 and the participation of communities in redressing 
the loss of native vegetation has increased with the National Heritage Trust funding 
4500 community landcare groups by 2003.38 
 
The recognition of the need for government and private landholders to work together 
for the protection of Australia’s biodiversity is also made quite clearly in the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Section 3 
(2)(g)(ii) of that Act promotes the need for “a partnership approach to environmental 
protection and biodiversity conservation through…conservation agreements with 
land-holders” in order for the objects of the Act to be achieved. 
 
However, voluntary conservation agreements with private landholders have been in 
existence for many years. For example, since 1948, 1,651,839 hectares of land in New 
South Wales have been gazetted as wildlife refuges.39 This voluntary scheme 
                                                 
31 Derived from United Nations and Australian figures, ibid, Figgis 2004, p. 1. 
32 Ibid, Figgis 2004, p. 1. 
33 Op. cit., n. 15, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 15. 
34 See Objective 1.5 Conservation outside protected areas, Action 1.5.1, National Strategy for the 
Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Dept of the Environment, Sport and Territories, 1996, 
Ch 1, http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy/chap3.html> (accessed 15/7/04) 
35 Ibid, National Strategy 1996, Ch3, Objective 3.2. 
36 ANZECC (The Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council), Australian 
Commonwealth Government, National Objectives and Targets for Biodiversity Conservation 2001 – 
2005, p.5. 
37 Op. cit., n 15, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 12, with the proportion of land in conservation 
reserves in 2002 being 54% in the Australian Capital Territory; 37 % in Tasmania; 26% in South 
Australia; 15% in Victoria; then dropping markedly down to 7% in New South Wale; 4% in 
Queensland; and 5% in the Northern Territory. 
38 Ibid, Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004, p. 15. 
39 Op. cit., n 13, Figgis 2004, p. 15. 
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provides no certainty for conservation objectives as the ‘agreements’ can be changed 
or even revoked by the landholders.40 In recent times, the Land for Wildlife scheme 
has developed throughout most states in Australia.41 This voluntary scheme requires 
an agreement to be established for a specified period between a landholder and the 
relevant conservation agency.42 The landholder is provided with some technical 
advice and support both through written materials and personal contact with extension 
officers who go into the field.43 
 
Meanwhile, binding conservation agreements have been developing over time with 
the provision of vegetation management plans incorporating technical and 
management advice and, in certain circumstances, financial assistance to the land 
owner.44 These have been refined and developed into a more sophisticated scheme 
under the new Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW) providing a binding incentive 
scheme for the conservation of farm land incorporating access to financial grants for 
certified plans. Figgis notes the likely extension of this beyond the borders of New 
South Wales.45 However, once again there is a fixed timeframe for such management 
plans. 
 
Heritage Agreements in South Australia were the earliest form of conservation 
covenant in Australia, providing financial assistance, advice and local government 
rate relief to landholders in return for retaining and managing the native vegetation on 
the land in perpetuity.46 Despite the uptake of various models of this covenant scheme 
throughout Australia, the South Australian community appears to have been the most 
committed to conservation on private land having concluded 1050 covenants covering 
over 550,000 hectares of land by 1998.47 The remaining states and territories 
committed significantly less land to private conservation at that time.48  
 
However, the conclusion of conservation convenants have been ever increasing 
throughout the nation allowing for detailed management plans to be established for 
the designated conservation area specified in the legally enforceable covenant 
registered on the title of the land.49 Unlike the conservation agreements mentioned 
above, these covenants are binding on future owners of the land and so provide a 
significant contribution to native vegetation and habitat conservation in Australia. 
Conversely, these covenants also bring with them additional responsibilities and costs 
to the landholder, not to mention a loss of land use entitlements.50 Where no financial 
assistance has been provided in consideration of the grant of the covenant, the 
landholder has effectively made a donation. This has been said to be akin to a 
                                                 
40 Ibid, Figgis 2004. 
41 Ibid, Figgis 2004. 
42 Ibid, Figgis 2004. 
43 Ibid, Figgis 2004, p. 16. 
44 Ibid, Figgis 2004, p. 16. 
45 Idib, Figgis 2004, p. 16. 
46 See s.34 of the Heritage Act 1985 (S.A.), see also the Native Vegetation Act 1991 (S.A.) 
47 Carl Binning and Mike Young, Talking to the Taxman about Nature Conservation: Proposals for the 
introduction of tax incentives for the protection of high conservation value native vegetation, National 
R&D Program on Rehabilitation, Management and Conservation for Remnant Vegetation, Research 
Report 4/99, Environment Australia, Canberra, 1999, p. 50. 
48 Ibid, Binning and Young 1999, p. 50. 
49 Op. cit., n 13, Figgis 2004, p.18. 
50 Op. cit., n 45, Binning and Young 1999, p. 34. 
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charitable gift.51 It is this analysis that led to the introduction of the conservation 
covenant tax incentive to be discussed below. However, the land owner does receive 
assistance in addition to the availability of tax incentives. For example, local 
government rate relief may be available.52 Further, covenant scheme providers can 
provide the land owner with specialist technical advice and even assistance with 
management costs such as for fencing, or assistance with pest control and 
revegetation works.53 The level of assistance will vary between covenant scheme 
providers depending on the level of services available and the extent of their 
budgets.54 
 
Taxation Incentives for Conservation Covenants 
 
There are two forms of federal taxation relief for conservation covenants that have 
been introduced in the past 3-4 years in Australia. One is the provision of a taxation 
deduction equal to the amount by which the land has been devalued by the creation of 
the covenant and the other is concerned with the impact of such a covenant on the 
capital gains tax provisions. 
 
The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to the amending legislation attributes 
the introduction of the special deduction for conservation covenants to the Prime 
Minister’s Community-Business Partnership recommendations of tax incentives to 
encourage conservation and philanthropy announced by the Prime Minister on 20 
August 2001.55 The capital gains tax (CGT) rules were amended “to ensure that land 
owners who enter into conservation covenants over their land are not disadvantaged 
compared with taxpayers who sell their land”.56 
 
However, such tax concessions for conservation covenants were the subject of a 1999 
report to Environment Australia evaluating proposals for the introduction of tax 
incentives for the conservation of native vegetation.57 In that report Binning and 
Young note that  
 
“Well-targeted incentives may have a greater effect on the behaviour of 
landholders than grants of an equivalent size”58 
 
This is due to the availability and certainty of the tax incentive over the grant. With a 
tax incentive it must be available to all landholders while grants must be applied for 
and are often at the discretion of a regulatory body.59 However, the regime 
recommended does not absorb the entire cost of entering into and maintaining a 
                                                 
51 Ibid, Binning and Young 1999, p. 34. 
52 Department of Environment and Heritage, Covenants for Conservation, Commonwealth of Australia 
2004 (brochure). 
53 Ibid, Department of Environment and Heritage 2004. 
54 Ibid, Department of Environment and Heritage 2004. 
55 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2001 Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act (No. 2) 2001, ¶1.15. 
56 Ibid, Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, ¶1.27, first announced by the government through 
the Treasurers Press Release No. 44 of 15 June 2001. 
57 Op. cit., n 45, Binning and Young 1999. 
58 Ibid, Binning and Young 1999, p. 20. 
59 Ibid, Binning and Young 1999, p. 20. 
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conservation covenant.60 There is a significant investment on the part of the 
landholder. The tax incentive provides “an efficient cost-sharing mechanism”, hence 
the partnership between government and private landholder.61 
 
To qualify for the federal tax incentives the conservation covenant over land must 
comply with three requirements. Firstly, the whole purpose of the covenant is to 
maintain the environmental value of the land. Accordingly, the covenant must restrict 
or prohibit certain activities on the land that could degrade that environmental value.62 
Secondly, the covenant must run with the land, hence it should be registered on the 
title to the land (where possible) to ensure its permanency.63 Thirdly, the Minister for 
the Environment and heritage must have either approved in writing the covenant itself 
or approved in writing the program under which the covenant is entered.64 
 
Conservation covenants entered into on or after 1 July 2002 attract a tax deduction 
under the provisions of Division 31 ITAA97. However, in order for a taxpayer to 
qualify for this tax deduction, they must be the owner of the land and the conditions in 
subsection 31-5(2) ITAA97 must be met.65 The shortcoming of this provision is the 
restriction to land owners, thereby disadvantaging the large farm leaseholders. 
However, when one considers the nature of the conditions in subsection 31-5(2) 
ITAA97 together with the definition of a conservation covenant in subsection 31-5(5) 
ITAA97, it becomes apparent that the leaseholder cannot meet those conditions. 
 
The conditions to be met under subsection 31-5(2) ITAA97 reinforce the cost-sharing 
nature of this partnership between the private land owner and the government. The 
land owner is permanently affecting their land through a perpetual covenant which 
places restrictions on use of the part of the land subject to the covenant.66 In addition, 
no “money, property or other material benefit” must have been received by the land 
owner for entering into the covenant.67 Further, the land owner must have sustained a 
reduction in the market value of the land greater than $5000 due to entering into the 
covenant.68 If a lesser reduction has been sustained, the land owner will not qualify 
for the deduction unless the covenant was entered into within 12 months of the owner 
entering into the contract for the purchase of the land.69 Finally, the covenant must 
have been entered into with one of the levels of government, an appropriate 
governmental authority, or “a fund, authority or institution” that qualifies under the 
rules for deductible gift recipients found in Subdivision 30-B ITAA97.70 
 
                                                 
60 Ibid, Binning and Young 1999, p. 20. 
61 Ibid, Binning and Young 1999, p. 20. 
62 Subsection 31-5(5), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
63 Subsection 31-5(5), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
64 Subsection 31-5(5), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
65 Subsection 31-5(1), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
66 Subsection 31-5(2)(a), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Subection 31-5(4) notes that “For the 
purposes of paragraph (2)(a), a covenant is treated as being perpetual even if a Minister of a State or 
Territory has a power to rescind it”. 
67 Subsection 31-5(2)(b), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
68 Subsection 31-5(2)(c) & (d), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
69 Subsection 31-5(2)(d), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
70 Subsection 31-5(2)(e), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Section 31-10 Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) sets out the requirements for such funds, authorities and institutions. 
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The amount available for deduction under section 31-5 ITAA97 is determined by 
calculating the difference between the market value of the land immediate before 
entering into the covenant and immediately after.71 If there is a decrease in the market 
value and that decrease is attributable to entering into the covenant then a deduction 
equal to the amount of the decrease is available.72 The landowner could choose to 
spread the deductions over up to 5 years electing the percentage to be deductible in 
each year.73 
 
Market value generally needs to be determined independently and by appropriately 
qualified individuals. In most other circumstances when market value is being 
determined for taxation purposes, obtaining valuation reports from registered valuers 
is common practice. For the purposes of the conservation covenant deduction, 
subsection 31-15(1) ITAA97 requires that the valuation of the change in market value 
of the land must be sought from the Commissioner of Taxation. This is qualified in an 
Australia Taxation Office fact sheet to mean that the valuation is arranged through the 
Australian Valuation Office allowing for an appropriate fee to be charged, which in 
turn could be claimed as a tax deduction.74  
 
Concessional capital gains tax (CGT) treatment may be available to land owners who 
have received capital proceeds for entering into a conservation covenant.75 The gain is 
classified as CGT event D476 and the time of the event is the time at which the 
covenant was entered.77 As mentioned earlier, the concessions are aimed at providing 
comparable treatment with land owners who sell part of their land. A capital gain 
occurs where the proceeds from entering into the covenant exceed that part of the cost 
base of the land attributable to the covenant. However, if the proceeds are less than 
the attributable cost base, a capital loss occurs.78  
 
Where the land owner complied with the requirements of Division 31 and qualified 
for the tax deduction under that division, no payment would have been received for 
the granting of the conservation covenant. In that instance the capital proceeds for the 
purposes of the concessional CGT treatment are usually the amount allowed as a 
deduction under sec 31-5 ITAA97.79 This is an interesting requirement, particularly 
when one recognises that the value of a deduction to a taxpayer in net terms is less 
than an actual payment made for the CGT event. However, when combined with the 
fact that the deduction allowed under Division 31 would not normally be allowed 
under the general deduction provisions, and certainly not allowed to a taxpayer who is 
paid for the conservation covenant, the disparity becomes moot. 
                                                 
71 Subsection 31-5(3), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
72 Provided that the decrease is greater than $5000 or the covenant was entered into within 12 months 
of the owner entering into the contract for the purchase of the land. 
73 Section 30-249G & section 30 -249H, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
74 This is also in compliance with subsection 31-15(2) Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
75 Section 104-47, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
76 Subsection 104-47(1), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
77 Subsection 104-47(2), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
78 Subsection 104-47(3), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
79 Section 116-105, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). It should be noted that under 104-47(6):  
“*CGT event D4 does not happen if:  
(a) you did not receive any *capital proceeds for entering into the covenant; and  
(b) you cannot deduct an amount under Division 31 for entering into the covenant.” 
However, CGT event D1 is stipulated to apply under those circumstances.  
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In calculating the capital gains tax applicable to the establishment of the conservation 
covenant, the cost base for the covenant is determined in accordance with the 
following provision in ITAA97: 
 
104-47(4) The part of the *cost base of the land that is apportioned to the 
covenant is worked out in this way:  
 
*Capital proceeds from entering into the covenant  
*Cost base of land x _________________________________________ 
Those capital proceeds plus the *market value    
of the land just after you enter into the covenant 
 
The part of the *reduced cost base of the land that is apportioned to the covenant is 
worked out similarly. 
 
The capital gain is therefore the difference between the proceeds and the cost base of 
the covenant. The tax payable depends on whether the land owner is able to take 
advantage of the CGT discount and the small business CGT concessions. In addition, 
if the land on which the covenant is placed was acquired by the land owner before 20 
September 1985, the land owner can claim the pre-CGT exemption and pay no capital 
gains tax.80  
 
The legislation provides the following example to illustrate the operation of section 
104-47 ITAA97: 
 
Lisa receives $10,000 for entering into a conservation covenant that covers 15% of the land 
she owns. Lisa uses the following figures in calculating the cost base of the land that is 
apportioned to the covenant: 
 
The cost base of the entire land is $200,000. 
 
The market value of the entire land before entering into the covenant is $300,000, and its 
market value after entering into the covenant is $285,000. 
 
Lisa calculates the cost base of the land that is apportioned to the covenant to be: 
 
$200,000 x 10,000 ÷ [10,000 + 285,000] = $6,780 
 
This means that the capital gain made by Lisa in the above scenario is $10,000 less 
$6,780 providing a capital gain of $3,220. However, if Lisa did not receive $10,000 
for entering into the covenant but instead qualified for the deduction under Division 
31 ITAA97, that deduction would be calculated using the market value of the land 
before and after the convenant, that is, $300,000 less $285,000, providing a deduction 
of $15,000. The capital gain in this scenario would then require a re-calculation of the 
cost base for the covenant and the new capital gain as follows: 
 
The cost base of the land that is apportioned for the covenant: 
$200,000 x $15,000 ÷ [15,000 + 285,000] = $10,000 
 
The capital gain in relation to the covenant: ($15,000 - $10,000) = $5,000. 
                                                 
80 Subsection 104-47(7), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
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However, Lisa would be entitled to use the CGT discount if she held the land for 
more than 12 months thereby reducing the capital gain by one half. This capital gain 
must be brought to tax in the income year that the covenant is entered into. However, 
Lisa may choose to spread out her deduction under Division 31 for up to 5 years. 
Clearly, the ability to invoke the operation of Division 31 in conjunction with the 
capital gains provision for conservation covenants provides a significant incentive to 
commit to permanent conservation management practices. However, one must keep in 
mind that the incentive is shortlived while the obligation to conserve the biodiversity 
on the land affected is perpetual. 
 
Conservation Covenanting Programs 
 
Before a covenant satisfies the requirements of Division 31, an application must be 
submitted for approval either to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage or to 
an organisation whose conservation covenanting program has been approved by the 
Minister.81 Approvals for conservation covenanting programs are for a three year 
period and must undergo a review of the operation of the program for the approval to 
be renewed.82 When, in turn, providing approvals of conservation covenant 
applications, the organisation operating the approved program should establish either 
an advisory board, technical committee or expert panel to assess such applications.83 
 
For an organisation to obtain approval for their conservation covenanting program a 
significant amount of work is required. In their application, the organisation must 
provide a copy of their “conservation covenanting charter, examples of a conservation 
covenant, plan of management, and any relevant templates or other supporting 
documentation…[such as a] stewardship program”.84 This is in addition to preparing 
a submission addressing the Guidelines for approval of a conservation covenanting 
program (the Guidelines).85  
 
There are eight guidelines to be addressed by an organisation seeking approval of the 
conservation covenanting program.86 These guidelines effectively set out the 
parameters of the conservation covenants. The first is the establishment of the main 
objectives of the program, namely, “to permanently protect, conserve and manage 
environmental values, through the use of a conservation covenanting instrument”87. 
Identifying environmental values requires a consideration of current environmental 
policy in the national and regional context. Specifically, the Guidelines focus on 
“native vegetation, biodiversity, terrestrial ecosystems, or native habitat with 
important conservation priority”.88 Simultaneously, these environmental values must 
be of high quality or significance.89 The Guidelines provide a number of factors for 
                                                 
81 Subsection 31-5(5), Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 
82 Department of the Environment and Heritage, Conservation covenanting programs and the Income 
tax Assessment Act 1997, Commonwealth of Australia 2005, p.1,  
http://www.deh.gov.au/biodiversity/incentives/covenants-guidelines.html> (accessed, 3/09/2005). 
83 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 2. 
84 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 1. 
85 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 1. 
86 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 2. 
87 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 2. 
88 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 3. 
89 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 3. 
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consideration on a case-by-case basis in determining whether the environmental 
values, the subject of a proposed covenant, attain such standing.90 This demonstrates 
the selectiveness of conservation covenanting programs and therefore the potential 
fastidiousness of the Division 31 tax deduction for conservation covenants. 
 
The second guideline requires the organisation to elaborate on how the permanency of 
conservation covenants will be arranged within its program including the need to 
arrange for their registration on title in order to comply with section 31-5 ITAA97.91 
Meanwhile, the third guideline focuses on the administering body, its ability for 
longevity and its pro-activeness in obtaining conservation covenants from landholders 
with high conservation value areas on their land.92 The fourth guideline requires a 
demonstration of the ability for the conservation covenant instrument to comply with 
section 31-5(5)(a) ITAA97, namely, “restrict or prohibit … activities on the land that 
could degrade the environmental values identified”.93 
 
The management of the land the subject of the conservation covenant is dealt with in 
guidelines five and six. A plan of management is required to be formulated either 
contemporaneously with the negotiation of the covenant or within six months of 
having lodged the covenant for approval.94 Management actions must be set out in the 
plan and must be binding on the land owner and even the administering body.95 
Allowable non-conservation related activities can also be specified in the 
management plan.96 Meanwhile a change in ownership of the land triggers a review 
of the management plan but at the very least a review must take place every five 
years.97 The stewardship program establishes the process under which the 
administering body will provide ongoing assistance to the land owner.98 Such 
assistance may include periodic visits, provision of management and technical 
assistance, monitoring compliance with the management plan and assisting when 
management problems arise, including the provision of financial assistance for 
specific management actions.99  
 
Monitoring and compliance strategies are required to be established by the 
administering body under guideline seven.100 The purpose is to ensure that the terms 
and conditions of the conservation covenants and the plan of management are being 
adhered to and to provide mechanisms to secure compliance or remedy a default.101 In 
addition, guideline eight requires the organisation to describe the circumstances in 
which a conservation covenant may be terminated or varied.102 However, it is noted 
that such action should only occur in exceptional circumstances otherwise the 
                                                 
90 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 3. 
91 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, pp. 3-4. 
92 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4. 
93 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4. 
94 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4, Guideline 5. 
95 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4, Guideline 5. 
96 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4, Guideline 5. 
97 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4, Guideline 5. 
98 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4, Guideline 6. 
99 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 4, Guideline 6. 
100 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 5, Guideline 7. 
101 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 5, Guideline 7. 
102 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 5, Guideline 8. 
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permanency of the covenant and ultimately the effectiveness of the program come 
into question.103  
 
These eight guidelines clearly demonstrate a positive reinforcement of environmental 
goals through the interaction between environmental policy and taxation incentives. 
The command and control measures in place to abate land clearing practices together 
with the positive schemes developed for the conservation of remaining native 
vegetation are surely assisted by the carefully targeted tax incentives for conservation 
covenants. It is a recognition of the important role played by private landholders in 
conserving what is left of Australia’s biodiversity as well as recognising that some 
form of financial assistance is necessary to this end. The choice of tax concession 
over a grant scheme is made evident by Binning and Young above who also point out 





This paper has demonstrated the need for a partnership between government and 
private land owners in order for Australia to achieve its international biodiversity 
obligations under the key instrument, the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992. 
This partnership has been assisted by the use of a tax concession or subsidy 
recognising the philanthropic donation of environmentally valuable land into 
approved schemes for conservation management. Although the initiative is a subsidy 
contrary to the polluter pays principle, the subsidy is limited in effect while the 
covenant scheme conserving biodiversity is perpetual.  
 
The effect seems to reinforce the importance of economic incentives working together 
with environmental regulations to ensure the necessary investment in environmental 
measures, in this instance, primarily by the agriculture industry. The operation of the 
conservation covenant program is a good illustration of the mutual reinforcement that 
can be achieved when bringing together environmental laws with tax laws. 
 
The question arises as to the success of the program. Conservation covenanting 
programs predate the tax concessions recently implemented and have displayed a 
limited uptake in States where they are most needed. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics has shown that there is a steady increase in conservation covenants 
nationally but what is required now is a correlation between the number of covenants 




                                                 
103 Ibid, Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 5, Guideline 8. 
104 Op. cit., n 45, Binning and Young 1999, p.20. 
